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David Hume and Thomas Reid by rejecting the view that the ideal reflects
the way human persons actually form beliefs. For instance, many of our
beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony, and the ideal fails to consider
this. RE claims that the ideal fails to hold not only for everyday beliefs, but
also for religious beliefs.
RE is not only a negative project in epistemology. It is not simply the
rejection of previous ideas. RE seeks to offer a positive account as well.
Various RE thinkers focus on different epistemological merits, such as
justification and warrant. Wolterstorff’s work focuses on the merit of entitlement as it relates to rationality. Are theists entitled to their religious
beliefs? Is there some epistemic obligation that they have failed to meet?
When it comes to discerning if someone is entitled to her belief, one must
discern if she has fulfilled her epistemic duty. This depends on various
factors and belief dispositions that a person has. For Wolterstorff, there is
no doxastic ideal for the ethics of belief that cuts across all persons, places,
and times. “Obligations to employ practices of inquiry are personally situated obligations” (111). In employing a practice of inquiry, one must choose
from among practices that are socially and personally acceptable, as well
as personally accessible (102–103). As such, whether or not one is entitled
to her belief is a complex person-situated matter.
Further, we often assess the rationality of our beliefs after we have
formed them. Part of being entitled to a belief is assessing the beliefs that
we find ourselves having. Our beliefs are “innocent-until-proven-guilty”
(257). Being entitled could mean that a person has considered various arguments against her belief and found her belief unscathed. Or it could
involve her deliberately intervening in the formation of one of her beliefs.
The only way we can discern if she is rational is by scrutinizing her individual belief system and the way she has used her noetic equipment (262).
Both volumes contain valuable discussions for those interested in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. Each would
be useful for supplemental reading in a course on philosophy of religion
or religious epistemology. Volume 2 is especially important for those who
are researching reformed epistemology. Both volumes are a must have for
those who are enamored with Wolterstorff’s writings.

Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by
Michael Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 206 pages. $70.00
(cloth).
Joseph J. Lynch, California Polytechnic State University
Michael Murray has written a provocative and challenging work on an issue that is often passed over far too quickly in discussions of the problem
of evil. In this work he gives the problem of animal suffering the attention
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it deserves, carefully analyzing various attempts to reconcile the omnipotence and benevolence of the God of Theism with the existence of animal
pain and suffering. Murray contends that this indeed can be done, and
while it is doubtful someone not already sympathetic to theism will be
convinced, the arguments are worthy of serious consideration and likely
to provoke further discussion on a neglected topic.
The critic of theism argues that [1] If God exists there would be no gratuitous evil (e.g., animal suffering), [2] There is gratuitous suffering, [3]
Therefore God does not exist. Murray acknowledges that a mere defense
of Theism is insufficient. A defense would show only that the critic has
failed to establish that Theism is unlikely due to the fact of animal suffering. That is, the Theist could claim endorse [1] and deny [3] from which it
follows that [2] is false. While such a defense may be successful, it provides
no positive reasons to reconcile animal suffering with the existence of God.
On the other hand, a full theodicy, which would explain every instance
of animal suffering, goes too far, because it seems unlikely that humans
could possibly know every divine purpose. Murray argues for a kind of
middle path, which he calls a Causa Dei (CD), a term he borrowed from
Leibniz. A successful CD would show that we are not justified in believing animal suffering to be gratuitous and thus counting the suffering as
evidence against God’s existence—in the light of our justified acceptances.
That is, the successful CD would undermine [2]. Murray then systematically analyzes several CDs, contending that at least some are successful.
In the first chapter of the book, Murray discusses three moral conditions that must be met for permitting evil.
A. The Necessity Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil,
E, could not have been secured without permitting either E or some evils
morally equivalent to or worse than E.
B. The Outweighing Condition: the good secured by the permission of the
evil is sufficiently outweighing.
C. The Rights Condition: it is within the rights of the one permitting the evil
to permit it.

What sort of CDs could do this? Murray proposes that the theist needs to
construct hypotheses (i) that show that the evil in question meets conditions A through C, and (ii) that the theist “is not justified or warranted in
rejecting in the light of the claims she justifiably accepts” (39).
Ideally, the justifiable acceptances in the CDs would be held in common
to theists and nontheists alike. Murray contends that many of the CDs
contain explanations that “do not stand in tension with most of what I will
take to be a common set of justified acceptances endorsed by individuals
who are reasonably well‐educated in matters of contemporary philosophy
and science” (39). Still, there may vast differences between what theists
and nontheists justifiably accept, so the objectives of CDs can differ. The
point of some is to show that the theist can defend the rationality of her
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belief in the face of evil; the point of others is to show that the non-theist
is not justified in rejecting theism on the basis of evil. Still others, Murray
claims, will do both. The CDs that purportedly can undermine the evidential argument from evil by showing that the non-theist is not justified in
rejecting theism on the basis of animal suffering are of particular interest.
If it turns out that all a CD can do is offer epistemic comfort for the theist;
i.e., theism is defensible only because the theist can maintain rationality
given what she but not the non-theist accepts, it’s hard to see how the CD
could be called a success at all. Indeed it would be hard to distinguish a
CD from a mere defense. But again, Murray contends some of the CDs
have enough force to demonstrate that atheism cannot be defended on the
grounds of appealing to gratuitous evil.
The scope of CDs discussed by Murray is impressive. He analyzes arguments carefully, critically, and charitably. He carefully dissects CDs that
associate animal suffering with the Fall, concluding that the variety of this
CD that appeals to a pre-human fall of Satan and his cohorts might be
defensible, since, at least for some of us, none of our warranted acceptances justify the rejection of this CD. Still, Murray acknowledges that few
people, theist or not, are likely to find this CD attractive.
The most compelling of the CDs Murray analyzes are the “nomicregularity” CDs. Murray favors the chaos to nomic-regularity CD (CTO).
The supposition of this CD is that a universe that moves from chaos to
order is intrinsically good, and that animal pain in such a universe is unavoidable and outweighed by the intrinsic goodness of the CTO universe.
Murray states, “Animal suffering is necessary since, in a world that is
governed by nomic regularity and CTO, a spectrum of organisms with
increasingly complex cognitive capacities is necessary in order to secure
the emergence of beings capable of morally significant freedom” (191).
Thus, Murray argues that the CTO CD meets all three conditions (Necessity, Outweighing, and Rights). But the critic’s position is that it does seem
logically possible that an omnipotent being could have brought about an
orderly world with significantly morally free beings, without the animal
suffering. Of course, the critic could be wrong, but isn’t she justified in
believing that the Necessity Condition is not met? So, the most that can be
said for the CTO CD is that appropriately amended, the theist can maintain the rationality of her belief because, for all she knows, the animal
suffering does meet the Necessity Condition. But the nontheist has little
reason to think this.
The least compelling, but perhaps the most interesting, CD Murray defends is an updated appeal to a neo-Cartesian view about animals. Murray
describes and defends this approach in some detail, and offers four distinct
versions of the view. In general the contention seems to be that we are not
justified in rejecting the claim that animals lack phenomenal consciousness. And without phenomenal consciousness, there can be no awareness
of pain. Clearly, without awareness of pain, there just is no problem of
animal suffering. Whatever the merits of this neo-Cartesian view, it is not
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properly a CD at all. There is no reason given for the permission of animal
suffering; instead, the Neo-Cartesian approach is simply to deny this is a
genuine problem at all.
While it’s not a proper CD, since a proper CD would have to acknowledge that animal suffering is an evil and then explain it, neo-Cartesianism
must be taken seriously. After all, if it is successful, the problem just goes
away. And recall that the standard for success is fairly low. Neo-Cartesianism need only be shown to be as plausible as not, given what we know.
The Cartesian picture can be supported by drawing a distinction between
access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a well-known distinction in contemporary philosophy of mind. Access consciousness simply
means that the mental representations are available for an individual to use
in rational action or speech. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective
feel, having to with qualitative experiences. A robot could access its various
cognitive states, avoid noxious stimuli, etc., while having no phenomenally
conscious states at all. There need be nothing that it is like to be that robot.
When Thomas Nagel wrote his famous “What it’s Like to Be a Bat?,” he assumed that there is something that it’s like to be a bat.1
That is to say, bats and other animals are sentient beings. So, NeoCartesians can maintain that while many animals may have access consciousness, they do not necessarily have phenomenal consciousness. And
it’s only phenomenal consciousness that counts from a moral point of view
and with respect to the problem of God and animal pain.
What then would make a mental state phenomenally conscious? Murray describes one theory as follows:
For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires an accompanying higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that state as its intentional object. The HOT must be thought that one is, oneself, in that firstorder state. Only humans have the cognitive faculties required to form the
conception of themselves being in a first-order state that one must have in
order to have a HOT. (55)

Thus, one can attribute a rich mental life to animals, including having
pain states, and recognize that these states can accessed in the cognitive
economy of individuals, playing a causal role in their behaviors, while
maintaining that animals do not have the higher order mental states that
would make them aware of the other mental states. So, they could actually be in pain, but since they don’t have the mental capacity to represent
themselves as being in pain, their pain is phenomenally nonconscious.
Murray shows how the neo-Cartesian positions can deflect various sorts
of objections. Behavioral evidence in favor of animal pain and suffering is
at best inconclusive because the behavioral evidence can be explained by
1
Nagel’s essay is widely published, e.g., in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1997). The distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness was first put forward
in Ned Block’s paper “On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness,” which is also
included in this helpful volume.
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appeals to access consciousness alone. Thus alleged similarities in behavior
can be accounted for by appealing to certain human cases where consciousness seems to play a role, but doesn’t, such as automatic driving, reaction to
painful stimuli without awareness of pain, blind-sightedness, etc.
If the HOT theory is true, phenomenal consciousness would indeed
seem unavailable to most animals. There are, however, alternative plausible theories of consciousness that are friendlier to the thesis that animals
are phenomenally consciousness than the HOT theory.2 And, if we accept
the neo-Cartesian view of phenomenal consciousness, we must also accept
that infants and severely mentally defective human beings do not feel pain,
for they would not have the capacity to have the requisite higher order
mental states to be phenomenally conscious. Perhaps, as Murray suggests,
harming animals is morally objectionable on other grounds, but torturing animals, infants, or severely mentally defective human beings would
clearly not be possible. If infants can feel pain HOT or similar theories are
false. With respect to animals, pain behavior is stronger than Murray acknowledges. Anatomical similarities between humans and other animals,
the fact that many animals have endogenous pain control systems, and
the observation that analgesics and anesthetics work on many animals in
just the way they work on human beings all suggest that many animals
actually feel their pains. Anatomical similarities and evolutionary evidence
provide strong (though admittedly not conclusive) evidence that animals
can and do suffer.
The skeptical argument of Neo-Cartesianism seems to run something
like this; because it’s possible that certain creaturely actions can be accounted for without appealing to consciousness, it’s reasonable to conclude they
didn’t. That type of reasoning doesn’t work generally, and it won’t work
here. It may be possible that I don’t sweeten my coffee, but whether or
not it’s reasonable to claim I don’t will depend on examining the actual
evidence. The evidence we have suggests that many animals do have phenomenally conscious states. Of course, in principle, much of this evidence
can be explained with access consciousness alone. But given that no one has
yet discovered a consciousness structure in the brain, we can also account
for human behavior without phenomenal consciousness as well. That’s
why it’s so easy to think of androids, robots, or zombies behaving just like
us without any phenomenal states at all. Neo-Cartesian arguments that
make animals into zombies can do the same for us. The problem of animal
consciousness is a special case of the problem of other minds. It may seem
possible to doubt the conscious states of other beings, but possibility does
not entail “as plausible as not, given our justified acceptances.”
It is not clear that any of the CDs or any combination of them is superior to the Inscrutibilist position Murray discusses in the very first chapter.
If one has good reason to think that God exists and would not permit
2
For a concise overview of arguments for and against animal consciousness, see Colin
Allen and Mark Bekoff, “Animal Consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness,
ed. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 58–71.
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gratuitous evil, then it follows there one has good reason to think there
is no gratuitous evil. It is just beyond the scope of human understanding
to grasp what those reasons might be. The nontheist is not convinced of
course, but also cannot easily show the theist’s view about God and animal pain is irrational. It is hard to see how the suffering of this or that particular fawn dying slowly in a forest fire is logically necessary to lead to a
greater good, even in the light of the more plausible CDs Murray defends.
It may not be reasonable to expect a CD or combination of CDs to do that.
The real value of Murray’s book is that it attempts to take the problem of
animal suffering seriously. The hope of the CD approach is to investigate
what some of those reasons might be. The danger of the CD approach, at
least for some of them, is they may unjustifiably minimize the significance
of animal suffering or simply explain it away. Murray’s work is a wellargued comprehensive examination of this topic making use of the best
resources not only from philosophy of religion, but also philosophy of
mind and ethics. It will provoke, I expect, lively discussion on this topic
for some time. It does not, however, solve the problem of God and animal
pain. That problem just won’t go away.

Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa
Scrutton. New York: Continuum, 2011. 227 pages. $120.00 (hardcover).
RICHARD E. CREEL, Professor Emeritus, Ithaca College (NY)
Debates regarding the passibility or impassibility of God have to do, in
large part, with whether God experiences, or even can experience, certain emotions. Thinking Through Feeling was written by Anastasia Philippa
Scrutton out of her conviction that philosophy of the emotions has important implications for answers to questions about the passibility or impassibility of God. Scrutton prefers to speak of philosophy of the emotions,
rather than of emotion in the singular, because “emotions are so diverse
that few generalizations can be made about them” (144). Hence, she prefers to take a Wittgensteinian, family resemblance approach to emotions
rather than seeking for an essence of emotion.
Through her historical survey at the beginning of Thinking and her
many presentations of contemporary scholars, Scrutton’s book proves to
be a valuable resource and she proves to be an able thinker regarding
her two central topics: the emotions and the nature of God vis a vis the
emotions. Her careful, penetrating analyses reveal a serious, subtle, wellstudied mind.
For readers unfamiliar with the divine impassibility debate and the
philosophy of emotions, chapter 1 is a valuable survey. For readers familiar with those topics, chapter 1 might be skipped except that Scrutton
does a good job of showing that, unlike what many believe, there is not a
sharp historical divide between those who believe in divine impassibiity

